If You Build It, Will They Come? The Competitiveness of US LNG in Overseas Markets by Bordoff, Jason E. & Losz, Akos
Jason Bordof f  and Akos  Losz
NOVEMBER 2016
 
IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME?
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG IN 
OVERSEAS MARKETS
B |  CHAPTER NAME
ABOUT THE CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY
The Center on Global Energy Policy provides independent, balanced, data-driven analysis to help 
policymakers navigate the complex world of energy. We approach energy as an economic, security, and 
environmental concern. And we draw on the resources of a world-class institution, faculty with real-world 
experience, and a location in the world’s finance and media capital. Visit us at energypolicy.columbia.edu 
         facebook.com/ColumbiaUEnergy                    twitter.com/ColumbiaUEnergy
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SIPA’s mission is to empower people to serve the global public interest. Our goal is to foster economic 
growth, sustainable development, social progress, and democratic governance by educating public policy 
professionals, producing policy-related research, and conveying the results to the world. Based in New York 
City, with a student body that is 50 percent international and educational partners in cities around the world, 
SIPA is the most global of public policy schools. For more information, please visit www.sipa.columbia.edu
energypolicy.columbia.edu | NOVEMBER 2016 | 1
IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME? 
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG 
IN OVERSEAS MARKETS
Columbia University in the City of New York
Jason Bordoff and Akos Losz*
NOVEMBER 2016
* Jason Bordoff is a professor of professional practice in international and public affairs, and founding director of 
the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Akos Losz 
is a research associate at the Center on Global Energy Policy. This paper is an expanded version of research done by 
Mr. Losz as part of Professor Bordoff’s Spring 2016 SIPA Capstone course.
IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME? THE COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG IN OVERSEAS MARKETS
2 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Tim Boersma, Tatiana Mitrova, Philip Hansteen, Matthew Robinson, Ira Joseph, Tony 
Yuen, and James Guidera for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of  this report. All remaining errors and 
omissions are our own.
IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME? THE COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG IN OVERSEAS MARKETS
energypolicy.columbia.edu | NOVEMBER 2016 | 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The first shipment of  liquefied natural gas from the 
US lower 48 states, made possible by the explosion 
in production from shale deposits, brought with it 
expectations of  great change for LNG trade. US LNG 
supplies have already begun to impact global trade, 
increasing the volume of  flexible cargoes available to 
markets traditionally dominated by long-term contracts 
between buyers and sellers. By the end of  this decade, 
five US LNG terminals are expected to be operational 
with a total capacity of  nearly nine billion cubic feet per 
day (Bcf/d). 
However, these new supplies from the United States, 
combined with new production from Australia and 
elsewhere, have set the LNG market up for a glut that 
threatens to depress prices. Speculation is now growing 
as to whether America’s new flexible export capacity will 
be fully utilized in the coming years, or whether some 
of  that capacity will lie fallow in the face of  growing 
competition. 
In this report, the authors assess the factors influencing 
the competitiveness of  US LNG around the globe and 
whether capacity will be curtailed in the near to medium 
term for economic reasons. The report gives specific 
attention to the economic and commercial factors under 
consideration by US LNG exporters and the outlook for 
US LNG sales into Europe and Asia. In addition, the 
study examines how the competitiveness of  US LNG 
may evolve in the medium term. In short, the authors 
find: 
• Companies will likely make decisions about 
whether to utilize US LNG export capacity based 
solely on variable costs. The offtakers of  US LNG 
agreed to pay fixed fees in the range of  $2.25 to 
$3.5 per MMBtu, which they have to pay regardless 
of  whether they actually lift their contracted LNG 
volumes. US LNG buyers from the five sanctioned 
LNG projects will most likely treat these fixed fees as 
a sunk cost, and base their export decision solely on 
variable costs. When the offtakers have the option 
to buy gas from the spot market, they should only 
elect to lift their contracted US LNG volumes if  the 
variable cost of  delivering US gas to the local market 
is lower than the prevailing market price in the same 
market. When the variable delivered cost of  US LNG 
is higher than the spot price in the targeted external 
markets, then the offtakers are better off  not taking 
their contracted volumes from the US terminals. 
• The arbitrage window (on a variable cost basis) 
to export US LNG to the main importing regions 
remains open, but the margins have become very 
tight. At the time of  writing, exporting US LNG 
on a variable cost basis appeared economic to both 
Europe and Asia. But the margin of  competitiveness 
for US LNG exports has become very narrow, even 
when the offtakers treat the fixed fees as a sunk 
cost. The fact that the variable cost of  delivering 
US LNG to Europe or Asia could stay lower than 
rapidly falling spot prices in both regions is due to a 
substantial reduction in vessel charter rates, shipping 
fuel costs, and the travel time from the United States 
to Asia via the expanded Panama Canal. 
• Small changes in a number of  variables can, at 
times, render US LNG exports uneconomic. 
While US LNG remains competitive in overseas 
markets at the moment, this opportunity can easily 
dry up, even with small changes in Henry Hub prices, 
vessel charter rates, shipping fuel costs, canal fees, 
overseas spot prices, and a host of  other factors. If  
the “netback margins” for US LNG exporters were 
to drop below zero, then the shipping of  American 
gas overseas becomes uneconomic even on a variable 
cost basis. 
• Full utilization of  US export capacity seems 
unlikely, especially if  overseas spot prices remain 
as low as some forecasts suggest. If  spot natural 
gas prices in the main gas importing regions remain 
low, and Henry Hub prices, shipping costs, and other 
variables are volatile over the medium term, then US 
LNG terminals will probably not operate at high 
utilization rates at all times. In such an environment, 
it is more likely that the arbitrage window for US 
LNG offtakers will open and close periodically, and 
at least part of  the US LNG export capacity will, at 
times, shut down on economic grounds. 
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INTRODUCTION
American LNG exports from the lower 48 states officially 
started in February 2016, when the first commissioning 
cargo departed from Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass 
terminal with a shipment of  liquefied natural gas to 
Brazil. In the first seven months of  the plant’s operations 
(through the end of  September 2016), a total of  thirty-
three LNG export cargoes departed from Sabine Pass to 
destinations in South America, Europe, the Middle East, 
and Southeast Asia.1 
By the end of  the decade, a total of  five LNG export 
terminals are scheduled to be in service with a total 
liquefaction capacity of  nearly 9 Bcf/d (Figure 1). About 
87 percent of  this capacity will be sold under long-term 
offtake agreements, while the remainder will be marketed 
primarily by project sponsors and their subsidiaries. 
Thanks to the unique contractual structure of  US LNG 
offtake agreements, US LNG will soon eclipse Qatar 
as the biggest source of  flexible LNG supply that can 
promptly respond to market price signals around the 
world.2 But just as the US terminals are ramping up 
capacity, the global LNG market is entering a period of  
oversupply and weak spot LNG prices across the major 
gas importing regions. In this new market environment, 
it seems increasingly uncertain whether America’s new 
flexible LNG export capacity will be fully utilized toward 
the end of  the decade. 
A total of  twelve projects have received the necessary 
permits from the US Department of  Energy (DOE) 
to export LNG from the lower 48 states to non–Free 
Trade Agreement countries,3 and the DOE has indicated 
that approvals will continue to be forthcoming for 
commercially viable LNG export projects that complete 
the regulatory review process at the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).4 A few years ago, 
considerable uncertainty existed about whether the 
Obama administration would approve LNG export 
terminals at all.5 Such concerns have since dissipated. 
Today, LNG export projects that have not yet taken final 
investment decisions are held back by market conditions, 
not by regulatory risks to development. Given how the 
global gas market has changed, the question new project 
developers face today is whether the global market will 
still want to buy LNG from the United States. 
This report identifies the determinants of  the international 
competitiveness of  US LNG, and assesses the likelihood 
of  US LNG export capacity curtailments on economic 
grounds in the near to medium term.6 The paper first 
analyzes the economic and commercial considerations 
driving the decisions of  US LNG exporters. It then 
discusses the current competitiveness of  US LNG in 
Europe and Asia, the two largest LNG importing regions 
in the world,7 and assesses how the main drivers of  the 
competitiveness of  US LNG might evolve over time in 
overseas markets. Finally, it evaluates the medium-term 
competitiveness of  US LNG in the 2020 time horizon 
and estimates the profitability of  US LNG exports under 
different assumptions. 
We conclude that the arbitrage window for US LNG 
exports remains open at the time of  writing, but this 
window has become very narrow. This means that even 
small changes in a number of  variables can, at times, 
render US LNG exports uneconomic and force at least 
some of  the US export capacity to shut down when 
shipping US gas overseas is not profitable. 
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Figure 1: US LNG Export Capacity in Operation, Commissioning, or Under Construction
Source: CGEP, based on company disclosures.
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THE ECONOMICS OF US LNG EXPORTS
Barring regular maintenance and periods of  unplanned 
outages, LNG liquefaction terminals outside the 
United States tend to operate at very high utilization 
rates, irrespective of  the actual gas market conditions. 
Liquefaction capacity utilization averaged 84 percent 
globally in 2015, which includes offline capacity in 
Angola, Egypt, and Yemen. When excluding offline 
capacity, the average utilization rate would have been 
92 percent in 2015.8 This high rate of  utilization stems 
from the fact that natural gas exporters around the 
world typically require long-term offtake agreements 
and relatively inflexible volumetric commitments 
from buyers to justify their upfront investments in 
highly capital-intensive field development and gas 
infrastructure assets.9 Under traditional long-term 
take-or-pay contracts, LNG buyers are not required to 
physically take the contracted gas volumes, but they are 
obliged to pay for it in full, including for the cost of  the 
natural gas fuel. Long-term LNG contracts, which are 
most widely used in Asia, typically have provisions for 
some limited downward quantity tolerance (in the range 
of  about 10 percent of  the annual contracted volume) so 
that buyers can adjust offtake volumes in any given year. 
But offtakers can only request downward adjustments 
for operational reasons, and they have to make up for 
such adjustments in subsequent years. The majority of  
Asian long-term LNG contracts are also believed to 
contain destination and resale restriction clauses.10 
US LNG—or liquefaction capacity in the case of  
tolling agreements—is also sold mostly under long-
term twenty-year contracts, but the buyers of  US LNG 
face no destination restrictions and have much greater 
flexibility in terms of  offtake volumes. Depending on 
the contract type,11 offtakers from US terminals have 
committed to pay a fixed capacity charge or a tolling 
fee of  approximately $2.25 to $3.5 per MMBtu, which 
they have to pay regardless of  exported volumes. But 
they are under no obligation to lift any of  the contracted 
LNG (or pay for it in full, including for the feed gas and 
the cost of  the natural gas used during the liquefaction 
process) if  the economics of  exporting US gas becomes 
unfavorable on a variable cost basis. 
Given the greater volumetric flexibility in US LNG 
offtake agreements, US LNG effectively competes with 
spot natural gas prices around the world, even when it 
is not sold on a spot basis. As long as offtakers have the 
option to buy gas from the spot market, they should 
only elect to lift their contracted US LNG volumes 
if  the variable cost of  delivering US gas to the local 
market is lower than the prevailing market price in the 
same market. The buyers, of  course, will still have to 
pay the fixed capacity or tolling fees stipulated in their 
long-term offtake agreements, but they will most likely 
treat these fixed fees as a sunk cost, which will not 
materially influence their decision to export LNG from 
US terminals. 
Based on this logic, the decision to export American gas 
from US LNG terminals that are already commissioned 
or under construction depends on two variables: the 
delivered cost of  US gas (excluding any sunk costs) 
and the spot gas price in destination markets.12 If  the 
delivered cost of  US LNG is lower than the spot price in 
any of  the targeted destination markets (that is, the so-
called netback margin for US LNG exporters is positive), 
then US LNG exports are economical, and offtakers will 
most likely lift their contracted LNG volumes from US 
terminals. If  the delivered cost of  US LNG is higher 
than the spot price in the target markets (that is, the 
netback margin is negative), then the offtakers are better 
off  not taking their contracted volumes, and US LNG 
export capacity may temporarily shut-in as a result 
(Figure 2).13 When the market price in the highest-
paying target market remains above the variable cost of  
US LNG exports but below the full cost (including both 
fixed and variable costs), as has been the case during 
most of  2016, then the offtakers will keep lifting US 
LNG volumes to minimize losses rather than maximize 
profits. As long as the variable cost of  exporting LNG 
remains below the spot price, the differential will help 
offtakers reduce their losses from trading on a full-cost 
basis.14 
The analysis in this report assumes that offtakers of  
US LNG will honor their contractual commitments and 
continue to pay their fixed take-or-pay or tolling fees, 
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Figure 2: The Export Decision for US LNG Offtakers
even when exporting LNG from US terminals under 
their contracts is uneconomic for a protracted period. 
However, some analysts believe that contract sanctity 
could come under pressure in the future,15 especially if  
buyers start to see their US LNG contracts as a permanent 
financial liability. Unlike typical European or Asian long-
term take-or-pay contracts, US LNG offtake agreements 
have no price “reopeners” or other formal mechanisms 
to periodically renegotiate pricing terms, particularly the 
fixed fees.16 It appears the only way for an offtaker to 
legally abandon its contractual commitments is to go 
bankrupt, which is highly unlikely in the case of  US 
LNG projects, given the fact that the offtake agreements 
have been signed by creditworthy counterparties at 
the parent company level (or are guaranteed by the 
respective parent companies in the event of  bankruptcy 
of  the subsidiary).17 Absent a bankruptcy scenario, 
US LNG contracts are defensible in arbitration court 
if  an offtaker fails to pay the fixed fees.18 But delayed 
payments during a period of  arbitration can be especially 
painful for American terminal operators, as US LNG 
projects are predominantly debt-financed, and their 
owners depend on fixed fee revenues to make periodic 
debt payments. So even though US LNG contracts are 
considered very strong from a legal perspective, they 
have yet to be tested in a stress scenario where buyers 
refuse to pay their fixed fees.19 
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As discussed previously, US LNG offtakers will likely 
make their export decision based solely on variable costs. 
Therefore, to understand the current and future economics 
of  US LNG exports, we must first define what constitutes 
variable cost in the netback equation. 
The full cost (or long-run marginal cost) of  producing 
and delivering US LNG to the global market consists of  
a number of  cost components (Table 1). The fixed tolling 
or capacity charge covers the capital investment in the 
liquefaction plant. The Henry Hub gas price represents 
the cost of  the natural gas fuel itself, while a 15 percent 
surcharge above the Henry Hub price primarily covers the 
conversion losses, namely the cost of  the natural gas used 
during the liquefaction process.20 Transportation costs cover 
vessel charter rates, shipping fuel costs, canal fees (where 
applicable), and port, insurance, and other charges. The cost 
of  regasification captures the tariff  that owners of  LNG 
import terminals charge for the use of  their facilities.21
Fixed Capacity Charges or Tolling Fees
The fixed capacity charges or tolling fees are a sunk cost. 
US LNG offtakers have agreed to pay a fixed sum (ranging 
between $2.25 to $3.5 per MMBtu) in exchange for their 
contracted capacity, regardless of  the actual export 
volumes. Offtakers from the five existing terminals will 
most likely treat these fixed fees as a sunk cost,22 which 
are not expected to influence export decisions. 
Henry Hub Feedstock Cost
The Henry Hub gas price and the 15 percent surcharge23 
above the Henry Hub price are variable cost items, as 
the offtakers will only have to pay these if  they decide 
to export LNG from US terminals. To the extent the 
offtakers have signed long-term contracts to secure 
continuous feed gas supply for their terminal capacity,24 
they can still sell back unwanted gas volumes to the US 
market at any time at a relatively small loss. 
Table 1: US LNG Export Cost Buildup by Region
THE DELIVERED COST OF US LNG 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on a range of industry sources.
* Fuel cost includes the cost of  the boil-off  gas (BOG) and the marine fuel that LNG carriers use for propulsion. 
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Transport Costs
Some LNG offtakers will consider the entire cost of  
transportation—including vessel charter rates, fuel cost, 
canal fees, and other cost items—as variable. However, 
some of  the major portfolio players—such as Shell, BP, 
Total, EDF, Engie, and Cheniere Marketing—most likely 
have LNG carriers on long-term time charters. To the 
extent they have no flexibility to redirect these vessels to 
more profitable routes on short notice, they will likely 
treat at least part of  the vessel charter cost as a sunk 
cost. Vessel fuel costs and canal fees are variable costs 
that US LNG offtakers will only have to pay when they 
lift contracted LNG volumes from US terminals. Various 
industry sources estimate that the Panama Canal toll for 
a midsize LNG carrier is in the range of  $570,00025 to 
$580,00026 per round trip, for example. 
Regasification Cost
The treatment of  regasification costs is somewhat 
inconsistent within the research community. Some 
industry sources consider the regas cost as part of  the 
delivered cost structure; some include it in Europe, 
where LNG competes with pipeline gas, but exclude it in 
Japan and South Korea, where LNG has no pipeline gas 
alternative; and some exclude it altogether. The question 
is not trivial, as the cost of  regasification is not negligible. 
Various sources estimate it at around $0.3 to $0.4 per 
MMBtu,27 which can make or break the economics 
of  US LNG exports in the current low overall price 
environment.
    
Regasification costs should not be a factor in the export 
decision to destination markets where US LNG competes 
only with other LNG sources on the spot market (like in 
Japan or South Korea). In these markets, all competing 
LNG marketers have to pay the cost of  regasification. 
On the other hand, US LNG will have to be competitive 
with pipeline gas in other markets like Western Europe, 
where significant and increasing amounts of  pipeline gas 
is also traded on the spot market. In these destination 
markets, the additional cost of  regasifying US LNG has 
to be included in the delivered cost as a variable item. 
In other words, the gas-on-gas competition is on the 
pipeline side in Europe and on the LNG side in Japan 
and South Korea, the two largest LNG importers in 
Asia. Therefore, regasification costs should be treated 
differently in the two regions. 
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Figure 3: Delivered Cost of  US LNG in Asia and Europe (as of  9/30/2016, $/MMBtu)
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Main assumptions: Henry Hub gas price at $2.84 per MMBtu (spot price as of  September 30, 2016), vessel capacity at 145,000 cubic meters, vessel 
charter rate at $33,000 per day, bunker fuel cost at $300 per ton, journey times (one-way) at 33 days, 22 days, and 11 days, respectively.
Based on our current estimates of  the delivered cost of  
US LNG on a variable cost basis, we find that the arbitrage 
window remains open (as of  September 30, 2016) in both 
the European and Asian markets (Figure 3). This is quite 
remarkable, given how much spot natural gas prices have 
fallen in both regions over the last two years. Gas prices at 
the national balancing point (NBP) in the UK—one of  the 
most liquid gas hubs in Europe and a widely used proxy 
for European spot gas prices—were at $4.69 per MMBtu 
as of  September 30, 2016, down by more than 40 percent 
from two years ago. The Japan Korea Marker (JKM)—the 
most widely used Asian spot LNG price benchmark—was 
down by almost 60 percent from two years ago at $6.08 per 
MMBtu as of  the end of  September 2016. 
The fact that the delivered cost of  US LNG could stay 
lower than rapidly falling spot prices in both Europe and 
Asia is due to a combination of  factors that have reduced 
the landed cost of  US LNG substantially since 2012. The 
variable cost of  delivering US LNG to Asia was about 
$8.0 per MMBtu in 2012, but has dropped to about $4.5 
per MMBtu by mid-2016 (Figure 4).
THE CURRENT COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG IN 
OVERSEAS MARKETS
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Figure 4: Delivered Cost of  US LNG in Asia in 2012 and 2016 ($/MMBtu)
As of  September 30, 2016, Henry Hub prices were only 
slightly higher than the average price in 2012, so the 
changing cost of  the natural gas feedstock played no major 
part in the sharp decline of  the landed cost of  US LNG.28 
Vessel charter rates and shipping fuel costs have dropped 
substantially since 2012 (as explained in greater detail in the 
next section), lowering the delivered cost by an estimated 
$1.9 per MMBtu and $1.2 per MMBtu, respectively. The 
recently reopened expanded Panama Canal now enables all 
but the biggest LNG carriers to use a shorter route from 
the US Gulf  Coast to Asia,29 which can further reduce the 
cost of  transporting US LNG to Asian markets.
The delivered cost to the European market has similarly 
declined from an estimated $5.0 per MMBtu in 2012 to $4.2 
per MMBtu in September 2016. The same factors (except 
the Panama Canal expansion) contributed to the lower 
delivered cost of  US LNG in Europe as in Asia (Figure 5). 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Figure 5: Delivered Cost of  US LNG in Europe in 2012 and 2016 ($/MMBtu)
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Each of  the factors contributing to the overall decrease 
in the delivered cost of  US LNG in overseas markets 
in recent years is subject to a considerable degree of  
uncertainty, and changes in each of  these “moving parts” 
can impact the future economics of  US LNG exports 
significantly. 
Henry Hub Prices
The Henry Hub gas price—the pricing basis in US LNG 
contracts—was highly volatile during the 2000–2010 
period, fluctuating between $2 and $15 per MMBtu. US 
gas prices have been generally lower and more stable 
since the start of  the US shale gas production boom and 
the emergence of  the Marcellus and Utica shale plays 
in particular. Due to the abundance of  low-cost natural 
gas in North America and a substantial drop in shale gas 
production costs in recent years, medium-term Henry 
Hub gas price expectations have shifted markedly lower. 
The current futures curve indicates that the market now 
anticipates Henry Hub prices to stay in the $2–4 per 
MMBtu range in the foreseeable future (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Henry Hub Gas Prices and the Futures Strip as of  9/30/2016 ($/MMBtu)
Source: EIA, Bloomberg.
DETERMINANTS OF US LNG EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
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However, history suggests that Henry Hub gas prices could 
very well turn out to be more volatile going forward than 
the futures curve suggests, which, in turn, could impact 
the competitiveness of  US LNG in overseas markets. The 
cold spell in Q1 2014 illustrates that Henry Hub prices can 
be extremely volatile even in the post–shale boom period. 
In February 2014, the Henry Hub gas price jumped to a 
monthly average of  $6 per MMBtu from an average of  
$4.5 per MMBtu in the preceding two months. Henry Hub 
prices, at times, exceeded $8 per MMBtu at the height of  
the cold spell as gas demand spiked, stock levels fell to 
historic lows, and well freeze-offs curtailed pipeline gas 
flows from producers to consumers.30 Such extraordinary 
seasonal swings may very well force a temporary shut-
in of  US LNG exports, especially in periods when US 
netback margins are relatively thin. 
Most analysts expect little material upward pressure on 
Henry Hub prices from the gradual ramp-up of  US 
LNG export volumes. The latest assessment by the EIA 
(from October 2014) found that even a massive surge in 
exported LNG volumes—to as high as 20 Bcf/d—would 
only increase average natural gas prices by 11 percent 
in EIA’s reference case scenario, and about 5 percent if  
tight oil and shale gas resources are indeed as abundant as 
foreseen in the EIA’s high oil and gas resource case,31 which 
has historically been a better guide to the supply potential 
of  American shale plays than the agency’s reference case 
projections.32 A recent study by IHS Energy suggests that 
more than 1,400 Tcf  of  natural gas (equivalent to about 
fifty years of  current consumption) could be economically 
produced at a break-even Henry Hub gas price of  less 
than $4 per MMBtu, of  which more than 800 Tcf  (or 
about thirty years of  current consumption) is available at 
$3 per MMBtu or less.33 
Potential regulatory restrictions on shale gas production, 
such as further limits on methane emissions, represent 
another uncertainty for Henry Hub prices. Tightening 
regulation could drive up production costs, depending 
on how the actual measures are designed. Furthermore, 
opposition from a growing “keep it in the ground” 
movement to new natural gas infrastructure—stemming 
from concerns over local safety risks and climate 
change—may also constrain gas supply in some regions 
and affect prices.34 
Vessel Charter Rates
Spot LNG charter rates for an average-size LNG tanker 
were around $33,000 per day on the first week of  
October 2016.35 Long-term rates, by nature more stable 
than spot rates, remain higher at around $70,000 per day, 
which Bloomberg New Energy Finance reckons is “the 
rate necessary to justify returns” for vessel operators.36 
However, we believe that short-term charter rates are 
more relevant than long-term rates when assessing US 
LNG export economics, as offtakers using LNG carriers 
on long-term charters will most likely consider vessel 
charter costs as a sunk cost.
Spot charter rates have risen sharply in the aftermath of  
the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 and the subsequent 
expansion of  spot LNG trade. Spot and short-term rates 
more than doubled from around $70,000 per day in early 
2011 to a peak of  more than $160,000 in 2012. But the 
high charter rates in the 2011–2013 period—and the 
expected increase in global LNG trade driven mainly by 
Australian and US export projects—triggered an order 
boom between 2011 and 2014, and vessel deliveries under 
these orders will keep entering the market through the end 
of  the decade (Figure 7). Fleet operators increased the 
size of  the global LNG vessel fleet by a quarter between 
2012 and 2015. As of  January 2016, about 150 new LNG 
carriers were on order. When delivered, these additional 
vessels could boost today’s LNG fleet by an additional 35 
percent in a couple of  years.37 
Since the 2012 peak, spot LNG vessel charter rates 
have dropped by nearly 80 percent to around $30,000 
per day in early 2016 (Figure 8). The dramatic drop in 
spot LNG charter rates is attributable to a number of  
factors, some of  them cyclical and some structural. The 
growing LNG shipping overcapacity after the 2011–2014 
order boom and disappointing LNG demand in some 
key Asian markets are the most important cyclical drivers 
of  the spot charter rate collapse. Lower oil and shipping 
fuel prices also helped reduce LNG shipping rates on a 
cyclical basis. 
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Figure 7: Number of  LNG Tankers Delivered and in the Orderbook
Source: GIIGNL, IGU 2016 World LNG Report, IHS 38 
Meanwhile, improvements in vessel design and engine 
efficiency have reduced boil-off  gas losses in newer 
vessels,39 and rendered older vessels—which are more often 
forced to compete in the spot market—less competitive at 
the same time.40 This represents a structural reduction in 
spot charter rates, which will likely be sustained even if  the 
LNG shipping market tightens over time. The emergence 
of  Australia as a major supplier of  LNG to the Asian 
market is also shifting the geographic patterns of  LNG 
trade, shortening voyages and reducing shipping capacity 
demand on a ton–mile basis. The greater efficiency of  
the existing fleet (that is, the fact that the same number 
of  vessels can transport more LNG on shorter voyages) 
also means that supply capacity is de facto expanding even 
without the addition of  any new vessels. This dynamic will 
further contribute to the structural softening of  the LNG 
shipping market as shorter trade routes emerge.41 
Industry sources generally expect the shipping capacity 
overhang—and low spot LNG charter rates—to 
persist in the foreseeable future. Affinity Research, 
for example, expects overall LNG vessel utilization 
to stay in the 75–80 percent range until 2018, and 
remain below 85 percent through the end of  the 
decade (Figure 9).42 In shipping markets, pricing tends 
to remain under pressure at utilization rates below 
85 percent.43 Some market analysts expect a tentative 
recovery in LNG spot charter rates toward the end of  
the decade, as capacity additions slow down and new 
liquefaction projects gradually absorb the shipping 
capacity overhang. Hence, there are forecasts that 
predict spot LNG day rates could rise to as high as 
$75,000 by the end of  the decade.44
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Figure 8: LNG Spot Charter Rates ($ per day)
Source: Affinity Research.
But delays in LNG projects currently under construction 
in Australia, the United States, and elsewhere represent a 
downside risk to the outlook for LNG shipping rates in 
the medium term. A significant portion of  LNG carriers 
in the orderbook have been ordered to serve a specific 
LNG terminal project. If  new LNG projects are delayed, 
then these vessels, in addition to those ordered “on spec,” 
will temporarily have to find employment in the spot 
market.
In theory, scrapping older LNG carriers or converting 
them to floating regasification (FSRU) or liquefaction 
(FLNG) vessels can help reduce the current oversupply 
in LNG shipping capacity.45 But given the relatively 
modern LNG fleet—about 78 percent of  the vessels are 
fifteen years old or less46 —scrappage and conversions are 
not expected to play a major role in easing the capacity 
overhang in the current cycle.47 In 2015, for example, 
only three vessels were scrapped and another four were 
marked for conversion out of  a total fleet of  449 vessels 
at the end of  the year.48 
On the other hand, a Fukushima-type “black swan” event 
can quickly increase demand for spot LNG cargoes and 
put substantial upward pressure on spot LNG charter 
rates almost immediately. 
Vessel Fuel Costs
Most modern LNG carriers use a combination of  
traditional marine bunker fuels and boil-off  gas for 
propulsion.49 Overall, fuel costs represent about 30 
percent to 50 percent of  the transportation cost, 
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Figure 9: LNG Fleet Utilization Forecast
Source: Affinity Research.
depending on the length of  the journey and a host of  
other variables, including oil and gas price levels, vessel 
size, and propulsion type, among other factors. 
Bunker fuel costs have decreased substantially with the 
2014–2016 oil price collapse. In the 2011–2014 period, 
when the average Brent price was $108 per barrel, the 
lowest-quality bunker fuel grade (IFO 380) traded 
mostly in the $600–750 per ton range (Figure 10). As 
of  September 30, 2016, when Brent traded at $48 per 
barrel, IFO 380 prices averaged a little over $300 around 
the world, according to Bloomberg data.50 Marine gasoil 
(MGO), which is also used in certain types of  LNG vessel 
engines, trades at a premium to fuel oil-quality shipping 
fuel grades.51 We can expect bunker fuel prices to remain 
very strongly correlated with crude oil price movements 
in the future, and both will likely exhibit a high degree of  
volatility going forward, potentially impacting US LNG 
export economics. 
Most LNG carriers have dual-fuel engines, and, in 
addition to bunker fuels, they also use some portion of  
the transported liquid gas—the so-called boil-off  gas 
or BOG—for propulsion. The “price” of  BOG fuel 
is the opportunity cost at which the transported LNG 
could have been sold, should it not have been used for 
propulsion instead. BOG fuel costs have also declined 
substantially in recent years, as both spot and oil-indexed 
LNG prices dropped significantly in major gas markets 
around the world. Asian (JKM) spot LNG prices averaged 
$13.9 per MMBtu in 2014, but only about $5.1 per MMBtu 
in the first nine months of  2016. European spot natural 
gas prices at the NBP hub averaged $8.2 per MMBtu in 
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Figure 10: Ship-Use Bunker Fuel and Brent Crude Prices ($/ton, $/barrel)
Source: Bloomberg.
2014, but were down to an average of  $4.3 per MMBtu 
in the first nine months in 2016. LNG prices—and the 
opportunity cost of  boil-off  gas—have historically been 
highly volatile, and we can expect continuing volatility, 
seasonal swings, and idiosyncratic events to impact the 
economics of  US LNG exports in the future. 
The Panama Canal Expansion
The expanded Panama Canal, which opened to commercial 
traffic in June 2016,52 has shortened the journey from the 
US Gulf  Coast to East Asia by about a third from 33 days 
(one-way) via the Suez Canal route to 22 days.53 In our 
estimate, the shorter travel time can reduce the delivered 
cost of  US LNG to the Asian market by $0.5 to $1.0 per 
MMBtu, depending on the vessel charter rate (Figure 11). 
However, a Citi report noted earlier this year that the 
Panama Canal route may be problematic for spot LNG 
cargoes, as canal slots have to be booked several months 
in advance and unscheduled spot cargoes may have to 
wait in line.54 The Panama Canal expansion represents a 
structural change that can improve the economics of  US 
LNG exports in the Pacific Basin on a sustained basis. 
However, potential wait times may erode some of  the 
Panama Canal savings for spot LNG cargoes and, at 
times, even challenge the practicality of  US LNG sales to 
Asia on a spot basis.
Spot Prices in Target Markets
Spot natural gas and LNG prices in the destination 
markets are yet another moving part in the US LNG 
export equation. Spot LNG prices are subject to a great 
deal of  uncertainty, particularly on the demand side. 
Climate policy efforts—from reducing coal consumption 
to increasing renewables use and energy efficiency—can 
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Figure 11: Estimated Savings Due to the Panama Canal Expansion
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Main assumptions: Henry Hub gas price at $2.84 per MMBtu (spot price as of  September 30, 2016), vessel capacity at 145,000 cubic meters, vessel 
charter rate at $33,000 per day, bunker fuel cost at $300 per ton, journey times (one-way) at 33 days, 22 days, and 11 days, respectively.
materially impact natural gas demand in major economies 
around the world. Relative coal and gas prices and the 
level of  carbon pricing will determine how much coal-to-
gas switching will take place in the electricity sector. 
The pace and scale of  nuclear restarts in Japan and 
the development of  India’s gas import infrastructure 
can both have a significant impact on the demand for 
spot LNG cargoes and spot natural gas prices in Asia. 
Normal weather-related demand swings and unplanned 
disruptions present further demand-side uncertainties for 
spot LNG prices around the world. 
The supply side—though somewhat more predictable 
than demand—is also highly uncertain. LNG liquefaction 
projects are large, visible, long lead time projects, and 
supply from these terminals could, in theory, be forecasted 
with a reasonable degree of  accuracy at least five years 
in advance. However, major LNG project sanctions 
were plagued by substantial delays in recent years, which 
complicates projections of  future LNG supply. An Ernst 
& Young report found that 68 percent of  the surveyed 
large-scale LNG projects suffered schedule delays.55 
Goldman Sachs estimated in 2014 that the average delay 
for an LNG project was close to three years,56 although 
the length of  these delays should drop significantly as the 
much-delayed Australian projects enter service,57 and less 
complex US terminal projects, which are more likely to be 
delivered on time,58 take center stage.
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Existing producers could also upset the supply side of  
the LNG market balance. A recent note by PIRA Energy 
Group noted that Qatar and Trinidad, for example, can 
potentially redirect gas exports to regional and local 
markets at times of  weak spot LNG prices, which could 
alleviate the growing LNG supply glut and support spot 
gas prices in major importing regions around the world.59 
Russia’s gas marketing strategy—whether the country will 
use its substantial spare production capacity to declare 
a “price war” and defend its market share in Europe—
presents yet another source of  uncertainty for natural gas 
supply and prices.60 
The overall size of  the spot LNG market may increase 
substantially, if  expiring long-term LNG contracts are 
not renewed, and if  Japanese LNG buyers—following 
an antitrust investigation by the country’s Fair Trade 
Commission61—decide to remove destination restrictions 
from existing long-term contracts and resell unwanted 
LNG volumes on a spot basis. Oil prices and oil-indexed 
gas prices will also indirectly impact the competitiveness 
of  US LNG in overseas markets, at least to the extent 
that existing oil-linked contracts have some volumetric 
flexibility embedded in them, and to the extent that 
anticipated oil price levels impact the competitiveness of  
future LNG projects—and thus future LNG supply—
backed by traditional oil-indexed contracts. 
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To stress test US LNG export economics in Europe 
and Asia, we used Goldman Sachs’s admittedly bearish 
medium-term price forecasts (from February 2016) for 
these two markets, and compared them to the delivered 
cost of  US LNG in these respective markets. Goldman 
Sachs anticipates European and Asian spot LNG prices 
to average only $4.0 per MMBtu and $4.25 per MMBtu, 
respectively, from 2018 through the end of  the decade,62  
well below the price levels seen in the past ten years. 
However, future spot LNG prices in both markets may 
be higher, if  LNG demand in China surprises to the 
upside, for example. This may very well turn out to be 
the case, if  domestic gas production in China continues 
to disappoint,63 pipeline imports from Russia get delayed 
(or never materialize),64 or regulatory measures—such as 
further restrictions on coal use or gas market reforms—
materially improve the competitiveness of  gas vis-à-vis 
coal in the Chinese energy system.65 Greater-than-expected 
demand from frontier LNG markets using cheap floating 
regasification terminals (FSRUs) and more widespread use 
of  natural gas in the transportation sector represent further 
upside potential for spot LNG prices in the medium term. 
We derived delivered US LNG costs by multiplying 
Henry Hub futures prices (as of  September 30, 2016) by 
115 percent, and adding to this our transportation cost 
estimates to Europe and Asia, as calculated by our model. 
The results of  this exercise suggest that the netback 
margins for US LNG exporters have become very tight, 
at least at the relatively low spot gas price levels forecasted 
by Goldman Sachs. This analysis suggests the arbitrage 
window for US LNG might not be open at all times. The 
window will more likely open and close periodically and, at 
times, may be open for some offtakers (for example, those 
who treat vessel charter rates as sunk cost) but closed for 
others (Figure 12). 
We also calculated the Henry Hub break-even prices that 
will be required to keep US LNG exports profitable on 
a variable cost basis in overseas markets. Our analysis 
suggests that Henry Hub prices will have to remain fairly 
low (below $3.0 per MMBtu) on a sustained basis to keep 
US LNG costs competitive in both Europe and Asia, 
assuming that gas prices in these markets indeed turn out 
to be as low as Goldman Sachs’s medium-term forecast 
suggests (Figure 13). Current medium-term Henry Hub 
gas price projections by various private sources generally 
fall in the $3–3.5 per MMBtu range,66 while the reference 
case in the EIA’s latest 2016 Annual Energy Outlook 
anticipates US gas prices to gradually increase to as high 
as $4.9 per MMBtu by 2020.67 These price levels would 
not allow US terminals to operate constantly at high 
utilization rates, unless overseas spot gas prices increase 
substantially from their current levels and remain well 
above the price levels envisioned in Goldman Sachs’s 
earlier medium-term projections.
We performed a sensitivity analysis to determine how 
sensitive US LNG netback margins will be to Henry Hub 
gas prices and LNG vessel charter rates. Our analysis 
indicates that US LNG will most likely be competitive in 
both Asia and Europe at Henry Hub price levels in the 
$2.5–3.0 per MMBtu range, even if  vessel charter rates 
increase over time. But if  Henry Hub price levels rise 
above $3.5 per MMBtu, then the arbitrage window will 
likely close in both markets, almost irrespective of  LNG 
charter rates (Figure 14). Our conclusions assume that 
both European and Asian spot prices will remain very 
low, at $4 per MMBtu and $4.25 per MMBtu, respectively, 
over the medium term.
THE MEDIUM-TERM COMPETITIVENESS OF US LNG 
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Figure 12: Delivered Cost of  US LNG versus Spot Price Forecasts in Asia and Europe
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Main assumptions: vessel capacity at 145,000 cubic meters, bunker fuel cost at $300 per ton, journey times (one-way) at 33 days (Asia via Suez), 
22 days (Asia via Panama), and 11 days (Europe), regas cost at $0.4 per MMBtu (Europe only), Henry Hub derived from futures strip (as of  
9/30/2016).
Figure 13: Break-Even Henry Hub Price Required for Positive Netback Margin in Asia and Europe 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Main assumptions: vessel capacity at 145,000 cubic meters, bunker fuel cost at $300 per ton, journey times (one-way) at 33 days (Asia via Suez), 
22 days (Asia via Panama), and 11 days (Europe), regas cost at $0.4 per MMBtu (Europe only), Henry Hub derived from futures strip (as of  
9/30/2016).
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Figure 14: Sensitivity of  US LNG Netback Margins to Henry Hub Gas Prices and Vessel Charter Rates in 
Asia and Europe
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Main assumptions: vessel capacity at 145,000 cubic meters, bunker fuel cost at $300 per ton, journey times (one-way) at 33 days (Asia via Suez), 
22 days (Asia via Panama), and 11 days (Europe), regas cost at $0.4 per MMBtu (Europe only), Henry Hub derived from futures strip (as of  
9/30/2016).
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Based on the above analysis, the margin of  competitiveness 
for US LNG exports has become very narrow even on a 
variable cost basis.68 Given the current cost structure and 
price environment, there is room for US LNG to compete 
in overseas markets at the moment. But this market can 
easily disappear in the future, even with small changes in 
Henry Hub prices, vessel charter rates, shipping fuel costs, 
canal fees, overseas spot prices, and a host of  other factors. 
If  spot natural gas prices in overseas markets remain low, 
US LNG terminals will not always operate at close to full 
capacity over the medium term. In this price scenario, it is 
more likely the arbitrage window for US LNG offtakers 
will open and close periodically, and at least some portion 
of  the US LNG export capacity will, at times, be forced to 
shut-in. 
Low (or highly variable) utilization at the existing US 
LNG terminals could have profound implications for the 
feasibility of  other LNG terminal projects awaiting final 
investment decisions in the United States. Poor utilization 
rates would mean that offtakers (though not the terminal 
developers) would most likely lose money on their long-
term LNG contracts. Korean utility KOGAS, for example, 
has committed to pay $548 million in fixed fees every year 
for the option to use 3.5 million tonnes (about 0.5 Bcf/d) 
of  liquefaction capacity at the second train of  Cheniere’s 
Sabine Pass terminal.69 Other offtakers made similarly large 
financial commitments to secure US LNG export capacities, 
which they now may not fully utilize. Lower-than-expected 
utilization rates at existing projects (and concomitant 
financial losses for buyers of  US LNG) would further 
temper the appetite of  potential offtakers for additional 
long-term LNG contracts. Without such commitments, 
the next wave of  LNG export projects, which will likely be 
needed to meet projected future demand sometime in the 
next decade, may not materialize in the foreseeable future, 
given the long lead times such projects require. 
By adding a vast supply of  flexible uncommitted LNG into 
the global natural gas market, US LNG is already changing 
gas market dynamics around the world in profound 
ways. Whether the world will want to buy all that gas, 
however, will depend on even small changes in a number 
of  key variables, with significant consequences for future 
investment, technological and commercial innovation, and 
global gas trade. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The first barrels of crude 
shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into tankers 
in May 2014. Threats of legal action by Iraq’s central 
government have reportedly held back buyers to take 
delivery of the cargoes so far. The pipeline can currently 
operate at a capacity of 300,000 b/d, but the Kurdish 
government plans to eventually ramp-up its capacity to 1 
million b/d, as Kurdish oil production increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

